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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

Ensuring student success has become an increasingly loud conversation for business schools.
Unfortunately, most of the solutions offered within the literature tend to be proffered by those at
elite institutions, and their advice unconsciously reflects that worldview. However, the vast
majority of us do not work at elite institutions, even those residing in the, by definition, limited
and prestigious universe of Assocation to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business International
(AACSB)-accredited schools. Subsequently, the elites’ problems do not match our non-elite
realities and, even worse, often push our issues into the background. This article seeks to explore
three student success concerns that are more relevant, yet typically undiscussed, to those of us at
non-elite AACSB-accredited institutions. These are the ways we collect and use data, an overemphasis on process without a firm outcomes perspective, and the increased emphasis on
efficiency-based measures of performance. By identifying and exploring these themes, this article
seeks to help reframe and broaden the conversation to include non-elite institutional issues about
how best to ensure student success.

AACSB; elite versus non-elite
schools; future of
management education;
managing a business school;
outcome assessment

Recent years have witnessed increased worries in business
education about how to improve student success. These
worries have emerged from a number of sources, ranging
from the popular press (Baron, 2015), to academic research
(Gupta, 2014), and perhaps most importantly, for the purposes of this essay, to accreditation agencies such as the
Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business
International (AACSB). Subsequently, educators are receiving contradictory signals about what student success actually means. One way to parse those signals is to examine
their sources. For example, we note that the signals can be
seen in terms of the different worldviews of elite and nonelite institutions. Thus, even though by definition AACSB
accreditation conveys that a school is part of a limited and
prestigious group from which all members can benefit,
there exists a wide variation in institutional status within
the AACSB member universe. For the purposes of this
essay, we use the term non-elite to denote those AACSBaccredited schools that are not very high research activity
institutions (RU/VH: research university/very high
research activity), using the classification language of the
U.S. Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher
Education (Center for Postsecondary Research, 2010), or
are not nationally or globally ranked by BusinessWeek,
Financial Times, or one of the other numerous rating
entities. Non-elites typically are regionally focused, and
are particularly reliant on sometimes unsteady outside
CONTACT Charles J. Fornaciari
© 2017 Eastern Academy of Management

fornaciari@lasalle.edu

revenue sources for covering basic operating expenses—
either as state-funded institutions or as predominantly tuition-driven private schools. Conversely, the elites, even the
public elites, often have the ability to use their significant
endowment and research funding to cover those costs. For
example, the University of California at Los Angeles’s
Anderson School of Management recently gained increased
autonomy from its state system in exchange for dramatically decreased financial support—a move that quickly was
followed by it receiving a $100 million endowment gift
(Byrne, 2015; Rivard, 2014). Given this background, this
essay’s main purpose is to explore some of the unique, yet
often underacknowledged, challenges that non-elite
AACSB business schools face with regard to helping their
students achieve success.
As a starting point for our conversation, we notice that
non-elite and elite AACSB business schools often have
missions that focus on different student success measures.
For example, non-elite public school leaders often define
success for students in terms of holding costs down and
offering more programs focused on increased postgraduation employment and higher salaries in job shortage areas,
including business, while decreasing resources for the liberal arts (Bender, 2011; Bradwell, 2015; Jaschick, 2011).
Thus, California State University Bakersfield touts the low
cost (especially when compared to private schools), flexibility, and convenience of its master’s in business
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administration (MBA) program (http://www.csub.edu/
mba). At private schools, with their higher published tuition rates, lower yields, and often aggressive discounting to
meet enrollment targets, success is defined in terms of a
tuition–salary “value” index—for example, Western New
England University emphasizes the affordability of its
MBA compared to other schools in the region (http://
www1.wne.edu/business/index.cfm?selection=doc.1279).
Conversely, elite AACSB business schools have missions that tend to focus on broader and more aspirational
conceptualizations of student success. For example,
Harvard Business School Dean Nitin Nohria recently
noted, “We realize the HBS mission of educating leaders
who make a difference in the world” (Nohria, 2014, p. 1).
Similarly, Dean Judy Olian proclaims, “At UCLA
Anderson, we’re not content with how things are; instead,
we look to the future to discover and chart what will be”
(http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/about). In the starkest of
terms, the elite schools assume that their already accomplished and academically well-prepared students will land
very high paying jobs after graduation; thus, they define
success for students as preparing them for the “opportunity to change the world.” Conversely, non-elites tend to
offer a success narrative based on preparing students to
get jobs with salaries commensurate to their tuition.
However, despite these different operationalizations
of success, we notice that many of the prescriptions for
improvement are created by, and aimed toward, elite
institutions, and therefore may be of limited use to the
vast majority of business schools. Consider, for example, Pfeffer and Fong’s (2002) work, which is one of the
most widely cited “business of business school” journal
articles. At the time, both were at Stanford University,
one of the most selective business schools in the world
—its 2014 acceptance rate was 7% (Badenhausen,
2014). Their view is evident when they explore the
impact of the MBA degree on consulting and investment banking careers (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002, p. 81).
While Stanford worries about how well its training is
helping its students to succeed on Wall Street and in
Silicon Valley, the vast majority of business schools
place their graduates elsewhere. Non-elite graduates
typically are hired for positions such as an assistant
human resources (HR) manager of the regional office
of a national bank or as a sales associate for the town’s
family-owned furniture store. If these graduates then
pursue an MBA, it is likely that they will begin their
studies earlier in their careers at non-elite part-time
programs, perhaps to transition to other industries
while not incurring the expense of elite, full-time programs (Hwang, Bento, & Arbaugh, 2011; Yeaple,
Johnston, & Whittingham, 2010). Although these
types of placements could be seen as “successful,” they

are not materially equal. Therefore, if schools that carry
the same accreditation are to produce comparable outcomes, approaches to produce such changes must disproportionately benefit the non-elites.
Consequently, we find Pfeffer and Fong’s (2002)
experiences to be significantly different from ours. They
proffer several improvement suggestions—almost all of
which are inapplicable to non-elite schools; we view one
as the most emblematic of the conversational differences
regarding enhancing student success. They argue that
world-class schools “concentrate on more experienced
students, often practicing managers who attend classes
episodically and then return to their work environments
to confront their learning with their everyday experiences,
and vice versa” (p. 89). In the non-elite world, every
enrollment dollar and full-time equivalent (FTE) counts,
so non-elites do not have the luxury of carefully “shaping”
their classes by rejecting 93% of their applicants. This is
even more problematic for non-elites, given that recent
declines in graduate enrollments impacted them harder
and more permanently than the elites, who have, and are
using, their expansive resources to aggressively recruit
premier students, often by drawing them away from
potential non-elite suitors (Baron, 2014; Baron & Allen,
2014; Byrne, 2014; Korn, 2014; Rao, 2015; Xin, 2015).
Likewise, elite school residents Bennis and O’Toole
(2005, p. 104) called for redesigning curriculum to include
more humanities and interdisciplinary courses to make
the MBA more relevant. Again, for those of us at nonelites, where our government leaders are advocating for
reducing liberal arts training, and where our business
school’s “low-cost per capita high volume model” often
underwrites expensive and limited-access programs like
nursing, we ask who is going to pay for all of the extensive
faculty retraining their proposal calls for, how can the
faculty members fit it into their existing obligations, and
would administrations willingly let their “cash cows”
morph into high-cost programs (Billsberry, 2014;
Okazaki-Ward, 2001; Piercy, 2000; Starkey, Hatchuel, &
Tempest, 2004; Vinten, 2000; Wilson & McKiernan,
2011)?
Finally, we see another aspect of the elite school worldview within our literature—the rankings game. Gioia and
Corley (2002) note that many schools play the game by
rigorously controlling the GMAT (Graduate Management
Admission Test) scores of their entering classes, while
Khurana (2007) discusses how schools attempt to move
up in the rankings game through the use of expensive
branding programs (pp. 343–346) and a reliance on using
costly “market signaling” techniques, to both potential
students and employers (pp. 347–352). Again, for those
of us at non-elite schools, the resource intensity of the elite
rankings game is astonishing.
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Thus, we are struck by the underlying, if unconsciously skewed, philosophy that drives the recommendations of “improving” business school student success:
All problems can be solved if you are not resource
constrained and you can use your admissions selectiveness to shape your incoming class. For those of us at
non-elite schools where we have fewer resources available to enact such strategies, the ideas put forth by the
authors at elite institutions give us little practical ability
to meaningfully improve our programs.
Although we are more sympathetic toward the nonelite schools, we do note that some of this situation likely
is self-inflicted. Due to a variety of reasons (Hedrick,
Henson, Krieg, Wassell, & Charles, 2010; Spritzer &
Billings, 2005), AACSB shifted its accreditation standards in 1991 from research to mission-based measures.
Although these changes opened doors for non-elites,
they also had unanticipated resource consequences.
AACSB schools can be more expensive to operate than
non-accredited schools on a host of factors (cf. Arbaugh,
Bento, & Hwang, 2010; Hedrick, Henson, Krieg, Wassell,
& Charles, 2010; Julian & Ofuri-Dankwa, 2006; Lowrie &
Willmott, 2009; Romero, 2008). Therefore, for nonelites, these changes came as a double-edged sword. On
one hand, there is increased prestige from AACSB
accreditation that enables them to recruit and attract
from pools of faculty and student talent to which they
otherwise might not have access (Casile & Davis-Blake,
2002; Hedrick et al., 2010; Romero, 2008). On the other
hand, they now have to attract or generate the support to
retain and service this increased human capital, and
historically they have been less prepared and able to do
so than AACSB’s traditional elite-institution members.
Additionally, non-elites cause self-inflicted wounds
due a desire to “grow their way out of their problems.”
For example, online learning mistakenly can be seen
as a magic bullet for adding revenues and FTEs.
However, online learning often is accompanied by
significant pitfalls, ranging from ongoing infrastructure commitments to the realization that the competition is now all schools around the world. The
continued lack of understanding of the unique circumstances of the new milieu can result in missed
enrollment targets and/or high dropout rates (Allen
& Seaman, 2013; January; Carr, 2000; Jenkins, 2012;
Park & Cho, 2009; Willging & Johnson, 2004). This, in
turn, results in higher costs per FTE, and it can be
exacerbated as schools engage in expensive spending
races as programs attempt to get noticed in an increasingly crowded marketplace (Fornaciari, Forte, &
Mathews, 1999). Again, these issues are not unique
to the non-elites, but they are felt more keenly due to
resource constrictions.
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Given the contextual factors just described, the remainder of this essay explores some systemic, yet often unspoken, issues that impact the ability of non-elite schools to
effectively teach their students and prepare them for success. Because the literature is vast on many of the microlevel
issues that impact success, such as motivation, skills, and
teacher effectiveness (Bacon, Stewart, & Silver, 1999;
Boyatzis, Stubbs, & Taylor, 2002; Hawk & Lyons, 2008;
Klein, Noe, & Wang, 2006), we adopt a macrolevel institutional perspective to explore the issues that we believe are
equally important yet for the most part have remained
under the radar in institutional effectiveness and student
success conversations. Even Kuh, Kinzie, Buckley, Bridges,
and Hayek’s (2006) encyclopedic review of the student
success literature favors micro perspectives, and their
macro conversations tend to focus on a number of wellknown topics, such as “successful student” courses (e.g.,
note-taking, study habits), the first-year experience, and
academic advising. Thus, we argue that most AACSBaccredited business schools (and, for that matter, those
who work with other accrediting bodies), but especially
non-elite institutions, are dealing with three increasingly
important issues that are systematically challenging their
ability to improve overall student success. These relate to
how institutions collect and use student data, an increasing
process versus outcomes orientation, and an increasing
prevalence of metrics focused on efficiency of resource
utilization. Our goal in this article is not to provide solutions to these problems, as all of them are complex, and
sometimes intractable, but to bring them to light to help
reframe the conversation regarding how we consider the
realistic institutional factors that influence student success,
especially at non-elite business schools. Thus, this article
seeks to explore the realistic issues that relatively resourcestarved and enrollment-dependent non-elite schools are
struggling to address in the cause of improving student
success.

Data issues and student success
Recent decades have witnessed an explosion in college
and university data collection activities as regional
accrediting agencies (such as Western Association of
Schools and Colleges and Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools), discipline-specific accrediting
agencies (such as AACSB International), the federal
government, and many public institutions and state
governments have demanded greater accountability
and transparency. It is uncommon for a modern-day
university to not have some form of “institutional performance” office for which the primary purpose is to
collect the school’s data, analyze them, and report them
to various oversight bodies. Similarly, most AASCB-
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accredited business schools typically have at least one
senior-level administrator whose primary function is to
oversee and manage data collection and reporting
requirements, especially those connected to Assurance
of Learning, and we suspect those related to the 2013
AACSB standards related to measuring “impact.” Thus,
it is not surprising that the number of administrative
personnel has increased dramatically (Anonymous,
2012). Faculty members are not immune to these
chores, especially those at non-elite institutions where
the work is not “farmed out” because research and
teaching assistants with qualifications similar to those
at doctoral institutions are the exception and not the
rule. Most faculty members have become increasingly
familiar with program-level assessment rubrics that are
designed to measure their students’ collective progress
toward some college-wide learning outcome. Ideally,
data generated from such initiatives could be particularly helpful for non-elite business schools (whose students are, by definition, not as academically talented as
their peers at elite institutions) in their efforts to elevate
student learning by helping them determine the number and types of obstacles students are most likely to
encounter in their degree progression, and the students
most likely to be impacted by those challenges. After
the school collects and analyzes these data, it can
experiment with and develop strategies to preemptively
identify students most likely to be impacted by particular types of challenges and the respective challenges’
successful navigation.
However, we are struck by the irony that more often
than not, while faculties collect and analyze the data on their
students, the first step toward reporting is to aggregate and
anonymize the data in the report. Thus, although institutions have become experts at collecting data, they often
remove some of the key information that actually may
help identify the weaknesses of individual students.
Likewise, the process suffers from other flaws, especially
from a statistical perspective because, in our experience,
faculties and administrators at non-elite institutions rarely
receive the rigorous training that needs to be an integral
part of any quality improvement process (cf. Kelly, Tong, &
Choi, 2010). For example, assessments often occur on class
sizes of 30 or fewer students, yet despite the common lack of
parametric validity of the data, faculty members typically
are exhorted to determine teaching improvements for
future classes based on a statistically insufficient sample
size (Bacon & Stewart, in press). For large classes that
achieve parametric sizes, control variables often are not
factored into the assessment, thus lessening the statistical
validity of the findings. Other sins committed include each
faculty member evaluating his or her own students, thus
inevitably leading to inconsistencies in application of

rubrics, or, even worse, a simple inconsistency within individual faculty members’ evaluation processes (either collectively or individually)—which often is seen as “yet another
report to generate” among the steadily increasing administrative burdens placed upon their busy days. When faculties
do collectively assess a common item, the chore often is
broken into various subgroups, which may change within a
term or across terms, once again leading to consistency and
reliability issues. Finally, standard practices, such as testing
for interrater reliability, are likely to be hit and miss.
We suspect that there are many causes that have led us
to this environment. Though we are not lawyers, we
believe that one concern is due to institutional caution
relating to the privacy restrictions imposed by various
laws such as the U.S. Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA). Another concern relates to what
admittedly would be significant coordination issues
among all involved parties, which likely are greater at
non-elite bureaucratic state institutions. Assuming that
there were no restrictions on the data, and that faculties
could, for example, know the true individual performance
of each student in each class (and not just the student’s
grade), it likely would take an enormous amount of work
and resources to build and run systems where faculties
could have individual and comprehensive insights on
each and every student. Complicating this is the idea
that these insights would need to be updated and refined
each and every term. Even though we offer a critical
analysis here, we shudder to think what such a system
would look like in practice, and what demands it would
place on both our time and our independence. Unlike
much of primary education, especially in the early years
where one teacher has one student virtually all of the time
for an academic year, the business school education
model, with few exceptions, is predicated deliberately on
fragmentation of the student’s educational experience—
and more often than not, this is presented as a feature of
the system. Finally, and ironically, AACSB (and regional
accrediting agencies, in our experience) seems blithely
unconcerned about these issues, especially those related
to data gathering and reporting, because, as has been
suggested, enforcement of such standards would shrink
AACSB’s own market and, consequently, its revenues
(Trank & Rynes, 2003). We suspect that most colleges
and schools avoid correcting them not only due to the
lack to strong demands from accreditation agencies, but
also due to the tremendous time, effort, and expense that
would be involved in actually generating data that would
pass the scrutiny of any respectable academic journal.
Thus, we are in a unique situation where most universities generate and collect tremendous amounts of
data about each student, but by design, data collected
for program-level assessment is often is “locked away”
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and faculty do not get to see it at a granular level.
Considering that at non-elite schools, where the onus
is more likely than at elite schools to be on elevating the
learners’ knowledge, skills, and abilities from an average or below-average level (or where bimodal distributions are more likely to be present), instructors being
able to access baselines for their individual students or,
for that matter, a class composite would be helpful in
determining areas of emphasis before the course begins.
In essence, we treat each and every student as a unique
and independent object in every course. For example,
Professor X may know that a student struggles with a
particular concept, which is a prerequisite for Professor
Y’s course. However, Professor Y likely will never know
this unless Professor Y encounters that student in class
and happens to discuss that student with Professor X.
Although individual students attend college and universities to improve their individual knowledge, skills,
and abilities, the great irony is that institutions have set
up institution and program-level assessment systems in
the past two decades that are uninterested in treating
students as individuals—their interest in students is
simply at the collective level, but even there their data
collection practices are weak at best.
Further, in an era where businesses are investing significantly in “big data,” it is not surprising that we are
witnessing the rise of large-scale institutional data collection activities (Ice et al., 2012; Picciano, 2012). However,
we witness some of the same issues that we discussed in
the preceding. Such data are not used to provide instructors precourse guidance regarding the learning needs of
their students, leaving instructors the options of either
asking all their faculty colleagues about their incoming
classes or having the good fortune themselves to have had
a student in a previous course. Schools often pick standardized exit exams, such as by the Educational Testing
Service (ETS), because they promise large-scale comparative standardized data and are comparatively less burdensome from a resource perspective than other assessment
processes. However, for a degree that ultimately is offered
as preparation for professional practice (Bennis &
O’Toole, 2005; Khurana, 2007; Trank & Rynes, 2003),
and by the time assessments such as these are conducted
and disseminated, it is usually too late to do much to help
the particular students who took the test (unless they
return to that school for an MBA; but even then, these
data tend not to be used to customize the students’ subsequent experiences). How much have we really learned
about our students toward being effective professionals
based on a multiple-choice exam?
Even some of the aggregate and cooperative data collection systems involving multiple institutions, such as the
Predictive Analytics Reporting (PAR) Framework (http://
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www.parframework.org), start the process with anonymized student data and institutionally deidentified
course level records. Granted, the primary reasons for
this approach are to protect student identities and for
schools to avoid divulging potential sources of competitive advantage to other institutions, but to use a manufacturing analogy, colleges and universities seem to have
taken the position that if 93 out of 100 cars are produced
defect free, then they have done their job well and they are
not particularly concerned about the problematic cars.
However, the customers who purchased those problematic seven cars are likely to have a very different viewpoint—and very specific concerns. Therefore, individual
schools now are using their own student data to build
models that support the development of infrastructure
that includes warning systems and targeted interventions
to improve student retention and graduation rates
(Kamenetz, 2016).
Thus, although we see that all schools, both elite and
non-elite, can take advantage of “big data” and overall
use data better to ensure student success, we believe that
this offers a much greater opportunity for non-elite
institutions. As mentioned earlier, outcome measures
that often are used as indicators of student success,
such as 4-year graduation rate, freshman retention rate,
and acceptance rates, vary significantly between elite and
non-elite schools. According to the most recent statistics, Harvard’s freshman retention rate is 97.3%, its
4-year graduation rate is 86%, and its acceptance rate is
5.8% (http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-colleges/harvard-university-2155). Conversely, the
University of North Florida’s rates are 82.5%, 21%, and
53.4%, respectively (http://colleges.usnews.rankingsan
dreviews.com/best-colleges/university-of-north-florida
-9841), and SUNY Oneonta’s rates are 85.3%, 52%, and
43%, respectively. To borrow a phrase from recurring
revenue industries, such as cellphone services, non-elite
schools suffer from greater “churn” than elites, and just
like cellular carriers, reducing churn presents tremendous financial upsides. Thus, because elite schools often
control success through their admissions processes,
there is more “upside” for non-elite institutions, which
often need to correct for student shortcomings after
admissions, to use big data to discover and correct
those issues that are preventing their students from
completing courses successfully, gaining positionspecific relevant work experiences with targeted employers, and graduating successfully in a timely manner. For
tuition-dependent private non-elites this can represent
significant cost savings, and for state schools this often
represents key outcome measures from governing
bodies and state legislatures. Because several elite schools
are members of public university systems, we also see
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potential advantages for non-elite public institutions
through their often-coordinated data collection and
reporting efforts at a state level, thus likely giving them
a “built-in” big data foundation upon which to build.
Indeed, the increasing use of performance-based funding or PBF (philosophically rooted in resource dependency theory; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978) by state funding
entities, with its emphasis on items like graduation rates,
certificates earned, enrollment in high-need subject
areas, and course completion rates (Harnish, 2011,) is a
prime example of this concept in action. As of mid 2015,
32 states in the United States use some form of PBF
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015).

Process versus outcomes and student success
We also need to consider significant advances in management thinking about how we measure processes,
outcomes, and results that seem to have not made it
into our conversations and consciousness. At their
core, accreditation agencies like AACSB tend to adhere
to a philosophy that good processes produce good outcomes (Moskal, Ellis, & Keon, 2008; Pfeffer & Sutton,
2006; Romero, 2008). Ironically, this approach, inspired
by the Deming and Baldridge awards, does not necessarily guarantee improved learning outcomes. History
is replete with Baldridge award winners that failed to
achieve any significant gains in market share or profitability. Likewise, AACSB’s emphasis is on process, with
its ideology that each school is best able to design
processes that are uniquely suited to its own mission
and vision (Moskal et al., 2008; Zammuto, 2008).
Considering our previous point that progression of
student knowledge, skills, and abilities is a key factor
from which non-elite schools can compete, on the surface, the concept of assurance of learning appears to
carry merit. Because the number of aspirant schools
declines dramatically for the elites in the accreditation
process, we see the issue of assurance of learning being
emphasized primarily for non-elite schools.
That said, what evidence actually exists that the
“assurance of learning” framework has produced measurable increases in performance in business schools in
ways that matter to students and the market of employers? And, with this school-level “uniqueness” perspective, have we set up a system where true measurement
across institutions is almost impossible to achieve due
to the variations in definitions and measures (Rubin &
Morgeson, 2013)? Although there may be some initial
approaches for assessing differences in MBA graduates
across institutions based upon differences between
schools’ learning goals (Costigan & Brink, 2015),
mechanisms for employing such approaches still appear

to be in the future. If this is the case, how will prospective employers be able to compare applicants from
different schools a priori? As employers increasingly
seek to place the responsibility for preparing and their
future workers onto other entities (Cappelli, 2015), we
can see where being able to directly compare “apples to
apples” could be an approach that these employers
could find attractive. However, presently we are in a
position of literally having hundreds of thousands of
students being subject to “assurance of learning”
regimes with absolutely no ability to determine, for
example, whether a student at a mid-sized public institution in Nebraska is any more, or less, skilled on a
single item than a student at a large private research
institution in Massachusetts. For that matter, we may
not even be able to determine differences between
graduates from mid-sized public or private (not-forprofit or for-profit) schools in the same state or
province.
In many ways, this approach works to the advantage of both the schools and AACSB: Schools can
create their own mechanisms for assessing learning
and AACSB can state that it requires members to
show that their students are learning, but this deliberate variability and incompatibility in measurement
systems do not necessarily serve the overall market
well. Furthermore, the attempts that schools have
made for standardized measurement, such as the
Educational Testing Service (ETS) Major Field Test
for the Bachelor’s Degree in Business (ETS, 2015), or
Peregrine Academic Services’ COMP Assessment
Exams (n.d.), all seem to be geared toward assessing
fairly rudimentary skills and abilities—just like the
concerns that we are seeing regarding the K–12 system in the United States. For example, one sample
question provided by the ETS (n.d.) is “A firm that
would like to know whether it has enough cash to
meet its bills would be most likely to use which
category of financial ratio?” Some authors have
openly questioned the ETS exam’s ability to serve
effectively as an assurance of learning tool, either
within an institution or across institutions, due to
multiple significant concerns about the lack of transparency in its construction and reporting procedures
(Green, Stone, & Zegeye, 2012).
Adding further insult to injury, emerging business practices that address these types of issues (Charlier, Brown, &
Rynes, 2011), such as evidence-based management (Pfeffer
& Sutton, 2006) and “checklist manifestos” (Gawande,
2011), are virtually absent in business schools’ selfmanagement. One reason for this is the amount of instructor control that is required to be relinquished. The “checklist manifesto,” with its focus on checklists and standardized
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procedures in medicine, has demonstrated its ability to
reduce errors in surgery and improve health outcomes.
However, much as in medicine, with its “omniscient” surgeon philosophy, business schools and much of the professorate suffer from the dogma that each professor is best able
to determine how to best teach his or her students.
Consequently, the idea of standardized teaching practices
is virtually anathema to the profession—we believe this,
unfortunately, has translated into the overall culture of the
management of business schools themselves. This issue has
become even more visible in the past several years as we
have seen many faculties—and not just at business schools
—react strongly against the perceived threat of MOOCs
(massive open online courses) using justifications that often
include concerns regarding loss of local curricular control
by using courses provided by elite institutions (cf. the
debate at San Jose State, and at elite Amherst, about
MOOC courses: Kolowich, 2013, April 29; Kolowich,
2013, May 2; Lewin, 2013). As Parker Palmer notes in his
book The Courage to Teach (1997), teaching is one of the
few remaining professions practiced in isolation compared
to other professions, such as law, which are practiced in
front of other experts; we daresay the management of
business schools suffers from the same problems. Thus,
checklist manifestos, with their inherent ability to standardize practices and improve actual outcomes, tend to be
ignored, by both the professorate and the administrations.
Thus, checklist manifestos, with their inherent ability to
standardize practices and improve actual outcomes, tend to
be ignored, both by the professorate and college administrations even when instructional autonomy is being openly
challenged by outside regulatory and funding forces.
We wonder whether AACSB-type assurance of
learning regimes and “each school designing its own
unique processes” models, with all their aforementioned issues, ultimately are doomed to failure. We
already are seeing reactions against ETS-type exams
and perhaps via proxy, AACSB-type assessment of
learning (AOL) approaches. These reactions often are
led by employers who both are suspicious of how
colleges credentialize their graduates and are increasingly demanding the ability to gain easily benchmarked
measures of the quality of the specific graduates they
are considering hiring. Higher education is beginning
to focus on producing direct measures of soft skills over
the current regime of simplistic knowledge assessments
and half-hearted assessment processes. This response
includes initial steps to create common criteria outcome-based audits for assessing university and college
effectiveness (Blumenstyk, 2016) to the Multi-State
Collaborative to Advance Quality Student Learning’s
recent project to begin designing, validating, and
using standardized student learning assessment rubrics
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across a variety of low- and high-level student learning
outcomes (Berrett, 2016).
The Council for Aid to Education (2015) Collegiate
Learning Assessment+ (CLA+) also implicitly criticizes
ETS-type exams for what they do not measure—namely,
items like critical thinking, problem solving, and writing.
The Council for Aid to Education has the support of
some of the most influential foundations in higher education, including the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford
Foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
The CLA+, which some have dubbed “the post-college
SAT,” was first administered in the spring of 2014 and
already has more than 200 participating colleges and
universities (Belkin, 2013). The CLA+ offers schools the
ability to compare their freshmen and seniors to asess the
institution’s effectivness over time. Additionally, the
Council for Aid to Education explicitly offers benchmarking data, at both the student and the institutional level.
Thus, while non-elite business schools often struggle with
the “capstone course” issue of trying to identify and then
build unique soft metrics as a means of signaling the
added value to their students’ skills and abilities, we
already are witnessing the emergence of perceived hard
outcomes-based student-specific assessments with benchmarking, even if some education critics have labeled them
as flawed products (America’s Future Work Force, 2013)
or if they are misperceived by businesses and the popular
press (Around Learning, 2013). And, perhaps unsurprisingly, the CLA+ is already being advertised as a way for
students to gain an advantage over their peers by presenting easily comprehensible standardized scores to potential
employers (cf. Lenson, 2013). Conversely, we see this as
much less a concern for elite institutions, given the signaling of student quality inherent in the “elite” moniker.
Thus, we ask ourselves, in a world where performance is the ultimate measure of success, are faux
process approaches, where any measure is acceptable,
already past their expiration date? If so, will we see
non-elite schools move in this direction before the
elites, as it would give the non-elites an almost immediately recognizable cost savings by reducing the
expenses associated with the various learning measurement processes? As the Around Learning (2013) essay
already referenced argues, we are likely to see widespread adoption of CLA+ types of assessment first in
spaces like for-profit and community and technical
colleges, as they offer either more convenient credentialing, but at a cost (for-profit), or greater “bang for
the buck,” with little reputational capital (community
and technical colleges). If these predictions come true
(and we suspect they will), the moves of for-profits and
community colleges likely would impact non-elites
more quickly and directly, as their price advantage
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and reputational desires represent a direct assault on
the non-elites’ value propositions. If this is the case,
how will we define student success in the future? Under
“an AACSB ‘process first’ and ETS-multiple choice
regime,” individual student success is commingled
with the institution’s overall academic reputation, and
consequently, individual students can either hide
within, or be held back by, their school’s umbrella. If
employers begin to routinely demand assessments like
the CLA+ to measure individual student capabilities,
then the entire cottage industry of “good processes,
regardless of outcomes” will be cast aside for a model
much more familiar and acceptable to business: absolute results on easily measurable and comparable criteria. We suspect the impact on all business schools,
but especially on the non-elites, will be profound if this,
indeed, comes to pass.

Class size, efficiency metrics, and student
success
One of the implications of the lack of evidence-based or
checklist approaches is that approaches to increase efficiency are adopted without prior testing or study. For
example, the inevitable move to larger class sizes
(Anonymous, 2012) is being adopted in spite of a general lack of research on the impact of class size in
management education. This trend is particularly salient for non-elite schools because offering courses with
smaller class sizes (particularly at the introductory/gateway level) often is used by non-elites as a recruiting
tool, though it inevitably adds to their institutional
costs in one form or another—either directly through
the need to raise tuition rates to pay for these smaller
classes or through “making it up” somewhere else in
the system. The few studies that have examined this
issue have tended to focus either on online environments (Arbaugh & Duray, 2002; Grandzol & Grandzol,
2010; Kulchitsky, 2008) or on smaller classroom-based
settings (Hawk & Lyons, 2008; Parnell, Crandall, & Bell,
2009; Sciglimpaglia & Toole, 2009), but they primarily
have been based upon samples from non-elite schools.
However, results from these studies are inconclusive.
The idea that class section size predicts course completion or learning in online settings receives mixed support (Arbaugh & Duray, 2002; Arbaugh & Rau, 2007;
Grandzol & Grandzol, 2010). Some classroom-based
studies note that smaller class sizes actually can be
problematic (Parnell et al., 2009). Collectively, these
studies suggest that we have a long way to go before
we can make definitive conclusions regarding whether
and how class sizes at non-elite schools affect outcomes
in management education. This lack of research

attention means not only that administrators may
push for larger class sizes on little more grounds than
the sake of efficiency, but also that instructors would
push for smaller classes on little more grounds than
personal convenience. Neither side in the debate has
sufficient evidence to determine whether, or how, its
proposed approach impacts student learning.
The push toward cost efficiencies as demonstrated
by increasing reliance upon contingent faculty also may
be having implications for accreditation standards. The
recently revised AACSB standard for faculty qualifications and engagement (Standard 15) that broadens two
qualifying categories (Academically Qualified or
Professionally Qualified) to four categories may carry
implications for business school payrolls. Of these four
new categories, three address practice: Practice
Academic, Scholarly Practitioner, and Instructional
Practitioner (the fourth category, Scholarly Academic,
appears to be similar to the previously used
Academically Qualified category). Although we applaud
the revised standard for the acknowledgment that business schools with different missions should be allowed
to differentiate their workforce composition to reflect
their respective missions, we also are concerned about
the potential incentives to “credential down” instructional staff.
Considering that scholarly activity has long been
established as a primary predictor of business school
faculty compensation (Certo, Sirmon, & Brymer, 2010;
Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Mittal, Feick, & Murshed,
2008), a possible implication of these revised accreditation standards could be that some non-elite business
schools may pursue less scholarly active, but professionally active, PhD holders in an attempt to control escalating faculty salaries. The 2013 AACSB Accreditation
Standards have a minimum threshold of 40% of a business school’s faculty meeting the Scholarly Academic
criteria (down from 50% Academically Qualified in the
previous standards) and 90% meeting either Scholarly
Academic, Practice Academic, Scholarly Practitioner, or
Instructional Practitioner criteria (AACSB International,
2013). This classification schema means that a business
school could staff up to 60% of its positions with instructional staff members who are not scholarly active and still
be compliant with AACSB guidelines. Considering the
relative resource constraints of public, master’s-level
comprehensive business schools in particular, this
could be an appealing strategy for administrators at nonelite business schools seeking to balance problematic
budgets, especially given the inevitable campus issues
that are created by business school faculty salaries
(regardless of their AACSB status) (Miles et al., 2014).
Non-elites could decide to address resource issues by
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carrying a relatively small cadre of moderately researchactive faculty and seeking primarily those with lower
levels of interest in research in their recruitment and
selection processes. Although such “AACSB, but on the
cheap” efforts may bring students more in contact with
practice, this approach may compromise business school
scholarly engagement. Considering that some studies
have shown that business schools with faculty members
who are extensively engaged in producing scholarship in
“just below” A-level journals positively affect student
salaries after graduation (O’Brien, Drnevich, Crook, &
Armstrong, 2010), such pushes toward increased cost
efficiency could adversely impact the likelihood that a
non-elite business school could attain this generally
desired longer erm outcome of management education.
Perhaps the most salient example of the issues relating to class size, efficiency, and student success can be
seen in the differences playing out in institutional attitudes related to online learning. Witness, for example,
the recently chronicled debate between Michael Porter
and Clayton Christensen regarding how their institution, Harvard Business School, should go online
(Neumeier, 2014; Useem, 2014). Despite the differences
in proposed approaches, Harvard’s ability, and decision, to shield its core operations from the financial
vagaries of bringing a program online stands in marked
contrast to the experience of the non-elite schools,
where the impetus is often a mistaken belief in either
cost savings or revenue maximization, which may be
further fueled by the idea that schools need to determine how to use the delivery medium that best fits
their own strategy and situation (Whittaker, New, &
Ireland, 2016). For the non-elite schools, online learning “cost savings” is often a “do more with less philosophy” for current staff (another prep for faculty
members), often with limited training for its unique
requirements (Alexander, Perrault, Zhao, & Waldman,
2009; Crawford-Ferre & Wiest, 2012), more students to
handle in the admissions and advising offices (Harvard
has a separate admissions staff, among many other
things, with its new Harvard Business X [HBX] program, as does Indiana University’s Kelley Direct), and
an overall “shorting” of essential administrative and
support services that support online student success
(Lee & Choi, 2011). On the revenue side, we see nonelite schools perversely incentivizing themselves to
admit more, and often less qualified and experienced,
MBA students, in attempts to capture larger revenue
streams (Arbaugh & Duray, 2002; Millson & Wilemon,
2008; Ozdemir, Altinkemer, & Barron, 2008)—in effect,
creating a Catch-22 situation of spiraling costs and
revenues. This approach further exacerbates the historically, and as yet unsolved, chronic problem of
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significantly lower student retention and graduation
rates in online learning (Allen & Seaman, 2013;
January; Lee & Choi, 2011; Simpson, 2012), and once
again creates greater churn for those institutions least
able to afford it. Thus, although both elite and non-elite
schools face tough choices regarding online learning,
we witness significant differences between how they
philosophically view and manage it, and we note that
non-elite schools are inherently pursuing riskier
approaches that can jeopardize both their financial
stability and service levels.

Moving forward
Now that we have identified the primary challenges in
measuring, monitoring, and attaining student success
in non-elite business schools, what are some strategies
for increasing the likelihood that our students actually
might be successful, and in ways that do not jeopardize
the well-being of the non-elites? Some of the trends we
have described will continue unabated—it is unlikely
that the efficiency conversations or the push for greater
amounts of data will go away anytime soon. The question is whether there are ways non-elite schools might
turn them to their advantage. We propose some steps
that will work with the flow of events rather than
against them. These steps pertain to instructional
approaches, faculty composition, and potential emergent applications of the move toward “big data” that
could assist instructors in customizing their courses
toward learner success.
Regarding changes in instructional approaches,
some of this shift could come from changes in measuring faculty teaching to better reflect desired learning
outcomes. Given the emphasis on showing student
progression being of particular importance to nonelites, this suggests that more concerted efforts to determine student knowledge and skill baselines upon
admission to our business schools are warranted.
Also, rather than assessing only cognitive or declarative
knowledge, higher level processes and affect also could
be assessed. This approach would allow us to determine
not only what concepts students know, but also
whether they see the material as useful now and in
the future because it has become part of their identity
(Brown, Arbaugh, Hrivnak, & Kenworthy, 2013). If the
course material is not shaping their attitudes and mind
sets in addition to increasing their knowledge, skills,
and abilities, they are unlikely to take away positive
impressions from their experiences or reflect well on
our programs to prospective employers and/or sources
of future students or financial supporters. Non-elites
also could give further attention to the “informal
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curriculum” of outside of class activities, such as internships, and seek to make them an increasing part of the
official curriculum (Caza & Brower, 2015; Narayanan,
Olk, & Fukami, 2010). Given our points regarding
employers increasingly expecting business schools to
provide employment-ready graduates, we are surprised
that less than 5% of AACSB-accredited schools require
students to have internships (Kim, Kim, & Bzullak,
2012). This situation provides the potential of temporary advantage for those who currently require them,
but we see this becoming more of a “cost of doing
business” for accredited non-elites going forward.
Other faculty composition changes also could be
leveraged to further enhance the learning process
while supporting scholarly productivity. O’Brien and
colleagues’ (2010) research on the economic impact
for students of academic research found that a faculty
emphasis on publishing in second-tier rather than toptier or lower-tier journals was the strongest predictor of
economic value for students. Although these authors
did not suggest reasons for this finding, one possible
explanation is that faculty in such environments have
to keep a presence in the worlds of both cutting-edge
research and practice. Although they may not be publishing in top-tier journals, at least some of the faculty
in such schools need to maintain contacts and networks
with scholars who are able to produce the quality of
work that will be published in second-tier journals. As
they also interact with more faculty more engaged with
practice (as revised AACSB standards appear to encourage, with their emphasis on showing demonstrable
impact of a school’s activities), this could create a
blend that combines current practice with emergent
findings from rigorous research, thereby helping students to better contextualize the examples of practice
they hear about and observe.
Such an approach to faculty composition actually may
be complementary with the potential efficiency-driven
faculty model for non-elite business schools we discussed
earlier. A business school could go with a model that
carries a larger component (up to 60%) of relatively
lower cost practice-oriented faculty, but use at least
some of the cost savings to attract and develop a smaller
cadre of faculty members who have established track
records of publishing in second-tier journals. Such faculty
may not have enough top-tier publications to be tenured
or promoted at the elite schools, but they likely would
have networks that include scholars from such schools so
that they can access cutting-edge research.
Some of the responses for considering student success will involve reconceptualizing how we think about
data, not just on the aggregate level. We are on the
verge of massive new capabilities in data collection and

analysis, but just like GIGO (“garbage in, garbage out”),
universities will have to design and use these new
systems to work at the student level. We have missed
previous opportunities (such as early conversations
about the promise of individualized student learning
coming from online delivery of content)—can we
afford to miss them again? Although collaborative
efforts such as PAR maintain anonymity of student
data in a multi-institutional format, the institutions
themselves certainly do not have to do so internally.
Because of resource constraints commonly associated
with non-elite schools, some do not have the expertise
in house to do the predictive modeling, and therefore
could use the assistance in making such efforts a reality.
Therefore, we see initiatives that seek to apply analytic
expertise to multiple college and university settings
such as PAR being particularly helpful for identifying
strategies that best support enhanced student learning
in non-elite business schools.
Although FERPA guidelines may not allow individual
student data to be revealed for truly individualized attention or their existence may simply be enough to deter
risk-averse schools (again, we are not lawyers), predictive
approaches still might be incorporated to help instructors target their instruction. Might it be possible to draw
upon “big data” at the course level to get a class composite before the course begins so that instructors could
tailor the course to a particular class’s learning needs
more closely? For example, could non-elite schools
examine data to predict a student’s performance in a
particular course offered through a particular delivery
medium (classroom, blended, or online) based on factors
such as demographics and prior performance, and then
make advising recommendations for which delivery format the student should use to take that course?
As beneficial as using data to predict student success
might be, perhaps a greater benefit of such data will be the
opportunity to identify particular impediments for student
learning and design and test interventions that directly
address those impediments. For example, the Signals
Project at Purdue University has used data generated
from predictive analytics to design approaches to anticipate
at-risk students and allows instructors both to identify
where students are likely to encounter difficulty and to
send targeted feedback that specifically addresses those
problem areas (Tanes, Arnold, King, & Remnet, 2011). If
such approaches can be effective at a school that would be
included in our definition of elites, how much more important is it for such approaches to be implemented at nonelite schools where showing student development and progression is paramount?
We also must get much closer to our students, not only
in ways we have used in recent decades with luxury dorms
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and so on, but also in our classrooms and in activities
outside of class. We need to be more active in determining
students’ abilities and providing that baseline information
to instructors. We need to find out exactly what types of
knowledge they want and desired learning outcomes they
are interested in pursuing. We also need to do a better job
of conveying what they should want—testing of affect and
attitudes (motivation, self-efficacy, identity) in addition to
content knowledge (Brown et al., 2013). One potential
implication of the increasing use of big data to predict
student and course activity is that as behavior data from
tools such as Learning Management Systems become
incorporated into predictive analytic frameworks, we may
be able to anticipate what students want based upon their
patterns of behavior in their previous online or blended
courses.
Finally, we hope that through this essay, the non-elite
business school will become a more acceptable context for
which business school authors can write and scholars can
examine. Presently, it is difficult to find information specific to non-elites because they tend to be either ignored by
the popular business press or combined with elite schools
to provide more general examples of practices when
addressed in trade publications such as BizEd or AACSB
eNewsline. Such coverage of non-elites makes it difficult to
find examples of their successes with these issues, leaving
their dissemination to events such as informal exchanges at
regional deans’ conferences or “success stories” on the
school’s website, for which many aspects of the issues
we’ve discussed do not lend themselves to external stakeholder-friendly sound bites. Academy of Management
Learning & Education has noted the importance of context
in management education research (Egri, 2013), and the
composition of the journal’s editorial board and its mix of
authors suggest that it considers perspectives from scholars
at both elite and non-elite schools. We encourage those
authors at non-elites to build on our ideas by explicitly
considering and articulating this context for both research
and future provocative essays.

Conclusion
Changing environments for business schools will continue
to make the definition and attainment of student success
difficult. We have shown in this essay that these environmental changes will not have the same impacts for all
business schools. In spite of these environmental difficulties, elite institutions still will be able to draw upon their
global reputations, alumni networks, and advocates with
governmental entities to help solidify their positions and
attract high caliber students. Conversely, the relative
absence of such attributes may mean that the continued
success of the elites comes at the expense of the non-elites.
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However, we also have identified areas where environmental shifts actually may present opportunities for non-elites
in their mission to educate their student populations.
Changes in the nature of instruction, the composition of
faculty, and availability of data present business schools
and faculty a moving target. However, we hope that in the
midst of these challenges, the changes can create opportunities to teach and assess in new and different ways, with
truly successful students being an attainable outcome.
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